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Abstract
The ability of individuals to learn optimal strategies for mitigation against infrequentlyoccurring natural hazards is explored. We report the results of two experiments in which
participants are faced with the problem of learning the most cost-effective means of
protecting against earthquake losses. The experiments utilize dynamic computer
simulations in which participants are endowed with homes in virtual communities that are
prone to periodic impacts by earthquakes. Participants can invest in measures that
potentially mitigate losses from quakes but the effectiveness of these measures is initially
uncertain. Over time participants have the opportunity to learn about true effectiveness
both by direct experience with simulated earthquakes and by observing the decisions and
experiences of other players. The data offer a pessimistic view of learning abilities; not
only do participants persist in investing in mitigation instruments that, in fact, have no
ability to lower damage, but they also fail to fully invest in instruments that are highly
effective. Among the mechanisms that appeared to impede learning was a tendency to
mimic local group norms in investment levels (which are suboptimal) and to prematurely
terminate attempts to learn. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of
the work for both basic research on decision making in low-probability, highconsequence settings as well as prescriptive research in natural-hazard mitigation.
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How skilled are individuals and communities at learning how to protect
themselves against natural hazards? On the one hand, it is clear that learning from
experience can, at times, be fast and efficient. Residents in low-lying communities that
endure major floods quickly learn where it is not safe to build homes and businesses;
likewise, hurricanes can offer a vivid lesson of the merits of building of wind-resistant
structures. Consistent with this, prior empirical work on how individuals make mitigation
decisions has consistently shown that direct encounters with hazards not only serve to
heighten individuals’ awareness of the dangers they pose, but also induce active
investments in protection (e.g., Lindell and Perry 2000; Peacock 2003; Russell, Goltz,
and Bourque 1994).
On the other hand, one might also point to cases where learning from experience
seems surprisingly slow and spurious. Despite the enormous damage caused in California
by the great San Francisco earthquake in 1906, for example, it was not until the Long
Beach earthquake of 1933--where there was considerable damage to schools--that
California established a building code for public structures (Andrus 1952). Similarly,
mitigation experts in the Midwest fight an annual struggle to debunk the widely-held
belief that the best way to prevent a home from collapsing during a tornado is to open its
windows (to equalize pressure)—a practice that, in fact has long been known by
engineers to enhance the chance of structural failure (Pendergrass 1999)
But are such anecdotes really evidence of slow learning, or simply examples of
the difficulties of making good decisions under limited information? Most of the damage
in the 1906 San Francisco earthquake was due to fire so that there may not have been a
connection made between designing better structures and reducing the likelihood of
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direct losses from an earthquake. Similarly, the misperception that open windows
mitigate tornado damage presumably persists because unambiguous counter-factual
evidence is rarely observable; if a house that leaves its windows open is severely
damaged by a tornado, one cannot observe the damage that would have occurred had the
windows been closed. What makes resolving these two views of learning efficiency
especially difficult is the limited opportunity we have to test hypotheses about the
dynamics of mitigation decisions in field settings due to the rarity of natural hazards.
The purpose of this paper is to examine how well individuals learn to make
mitigation decisions over time in laboratory environments that simulate repeated
exposures to natural hazards. In these experiments participants are endowed with homes
in virtual communities that are prone to earthquakes. Over time they have the opportunity
to learn about effective mitigation strategies both by direct experience as well as by
observing the decisions and experiences of others.
We emerge from these studies with a disquieting view of the limits of individual
and social learning. Although participants are endowed with ample opportunities to learn,
investment patterns were marked by a tendency to over- invest in mitigation when it was
normatively ineffective and under-invest when it was highly effective. These biases did
not vanish with experience. Among the apparent causes was a tendency to make
decisions by simply mimicking the investments made by other participants, and to cease
attempts to actively learn early in the task.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section characterizes the dynamic
mitigation problem that forms the focus of our experimental work and shows how it
would be solved by optimal agents. Section 3 explores why actual behavior might depart
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from this benchmark based on previous research on limits to inductive learning. Section
4 examines the actual ability of individuals to learn optimal earthquake mitigation
strategies in the context of two laboratory experiments. The concluding section interprets
these findings and suggests future research to be undertaken on learning from experience.
1. Inductive Social Learning of Mitigation Strategies
We consider how individuals solve mitigation problems that have the following
structure:
A decision maker is endowed with a home and wealth W in a community prone to
earthquakes. At each moment in time t there is a known constant probability pq
that an earthquake will occur at a random location in the region, the intensity of
which is an independent random draw from a known density f(q). If a quake
occurs, each member of the community must pay an amount for repairs that is an
increasing function of the magnitude of the quake and proximity to the epicenter.
To mitigate such losses, each decision maker can use a portion of their wealth in
time t to make non-recoverable investments It in permanent structural
improvements up to some maximum amount Imax . This investment reduces
potential losses by a fraction mIt, where m is the marginal effectiveness of a dollar
spent on mitigation. These investments—as well as earthquake damages—are
commonly observed, and wealth not spent on mitigation cannot be externally
invested. The marginal effectiveness of mitigation, m, is uncertain at the start of
the sequence of decisions. Specifically, there is a known probability pm that
mitigation will have a high marginal effectiveness mH and a probability 1-pH that
it will have a low marginal effectiveness mL. Each decision maker makes a series
of decisions about how much to invest in mitigation so as to maximize total
wealth over a finite time horizon.
If this dynamic game against nature were to be repeated several times, is there a
“right” way for each participant to learn about the proper amount to invest in mitigation?
There is, but it might not be one that would be either intuitive or palatable to decision
makers. To see this, first note that an implication of the assumption that mitigation
investments has a constant marginal effectiveness (m) is that the optimal investment
strategy will be all-or-nothing: if a homeowner concludes that it is worthwhile to invest a
limited amount I to protect against earthquakes, he or she should observe that even better
returns could be had by investing a successively higher amounts I+ up to the maximum,
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Imax . Hence, if a homeowner were to know the true marginal value of mitigation (m) the
optimal policy would have the following form: if E ( L | pq , I , m, T ) is the expected

cumulative loss over a T-period time horizon in a setting with an earthquake risk pq, with
investment I and marginal effectiveness m, the optimal mitigation strategy is:
⎧I
Invest: ⎨ max
⎩ 0

if
E ( L | pq , I max , m, T ) − E ( L | pq ,0, T ) <I max
.
otherwise

(1)

Note that under such an analysis the wisdom of investing will be strictly decreasing in T;
hence, if it is deemed not to be worthwhile to invest in mitigation in the first year of
tenure, it cannot be worthwhile in any later year.
What complicates this problem, however, is that expression (1) will not be the
optimal investment policy for a decision maker who is uncertain about m and has the
opportunity to repeatedly revisit the decision. In such cases the task of deciding how
much to spend in each period becomes a problem in stochastic-dynamic programming,
where each decision maker would be presumed to be able to look to the future over
several rounds of homeownership (and rebuilding) and make the investment decision that
maximizes long-term expected wealth assuming that what is learned about the
effectiveness of mitigation (m) in each period t is used to make more informed decisions
in period t+1,

t= 1…. T-1 (Meyer and Hutchinson 2001). For example, a rational

multi-round investment strategy might involve undertaking a high initial experimental
investment level (I1*), and then observing how experienced damages compare to those
that would have been predicted under the hypothesis that the true effectiveness is either
mH or mL given the quake’s magnitude and proximity. This discovery would then be used
to guide investment decisions in subsequent trials and games (Meyer and Shi 1995). For
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low probability events, such as earthquakes, it may be difficult to learn about the
effectiveness of mitigation given that few quakes will occur in ones lifetime.
The nature and effectiveness of heuristic solutions

It is unlikely, of course, that real decision makers would make mitigation
decisions over time in a way that mirrors the above normative process. Even if one had a
good working knowledge of the principles of optimal dynamic decision making, the
enormous complexity of the risk function in this case would likely thwart attempts at
analytic solution. Specifically, note that a household’s cumulative expected losses will
be a function not just of the amount invested in mitigation in each period t (It), its true
effectiveness (the uncertain parameter m), and the incidence rate of quakes (pq), but also
the joint density of severity and distance—all integrated over the expected horizon of
home ownership.
How accurate will homeowners be in making intuitive decisions about mitigation?
The literature is somewhat ambiguous in its guidance. On the one hand, laboratory
research on intuitive decision making under uncertainty has repeatedly shown human
decision makers to perform quite poorly compared to optimal benchmarks, encumbered
by biases such as a tendency for people to be myopic in their thinking (Kunreuther,
Onculer, and Slovic 1998), underutilize information about probabilities (Kunreuther, et
al,2002) and be sensitive to normatively-irrelevant frames of reference (such as a bias
toward choosing status-quo actions; e.g., Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988). Likewise,
there is little empirical evidence suggesting that individuals know how to optimally
update beliefs about mitigation effectiveness in light of accumulated observations (e.g.,
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Grether, 1980), or strategically choose investments so as to maximize future information
value (e.g., Meyer and Shi 1995).
On the other hand, there is also evidence that shows that when individuals are
allowed to learn by trial-and-error they can often display behaviors that closely resemble
those prescribed by complex optimal models, even though decisions makers have little
insight into the mathematics that underlie the optima (e.g., Meyer and Hutchinson 2001).
Specifically, all that may be required is that people operate in an environment where
optimal policies yield outcomes that are observably better than suboptimal ones, and
where there are opportunities to repeatedly see these outcomes (e.g., Fudenberg and
Levine 2000; Kalai and Lehrer 1993; Meyer and Hutchinson 2001).
Would naïve learning lead decision makers to optimal mitigation strategies in out
task? To investigate this, consider a version of our task in which investments in
mitigation (It) are scaled over the unit interval such that 1- It implies the percentage of
damage from a quake that could potentially be avoided if mitigation was perfectly
effective given the investment It. Specifically, if a homeowner decides to invest It in
protection and experiences a quake that would normally render the damage d*t given no
mitigation, he or she would experience the fractional damage dt= d t* (1-mIt) +ε , where m
is a (0,1)-bounded increasing measure of the true marginal effectiveness of mitigation
(initially unknown by the decision maker), and ε is an independently-distributed random
variable with mean 0 and variance Var(ε).
While a large number of rules might characterize how a decision maker might try
to learn in such a setting, one process that is often posited in the literature is simple
reinforcement learning (e.g., Erev and Roth 1998). Specifically, applied here the a
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homeowner would be assumed to try to learn the optimal level of It to purchase over time
by using the following trial-and-error rule:
1. Choose an initial investment level I1 at random from the interval (0, 1), and
make no changes in investment until an earthquake is observed.
2. Given a quake, compare the damage, dt, to a guess about the amount that
would have occurred had there been zero investment in mitigation. This
guess, d t' , is an independent random draw from a distribution centered about
the true unmitigated damage dt*; i.e., d t' = d t* + δ , where δ is an
independently-distributed random variable with mean 0 and variance Var(δ).
3. If the observed damage is less than d t' , conclude that mitigation is effective,
and increase investment by an amount z. If not, decrease it by z.
It is easy to show that such a naïve learning process could lead a decision maker a
optimal mitigation policy, but only under two limited conditions: mitigation must be truly
effective (b must be greater than 0) and there cannot be excessive noise in either the
conjectures about unmitigated damage (the error δ) or the process that determines
damage from quakes (the error ε). To see this, note that the decision maker will choose
to invest more in mitigation after an earthquake (decide z>0) if the observed damage (dt)
is less than that which they imagine would have occurred had they not invested (dt’).
Such conclusions, in turn, would be increasingly likely to occur as:
1)

The decision maker’s real level of protection against quakes increases
(given by the quantity mIt ); and

2)

The odds that they erroneously observe dt< d’t decreases; that is, the
more accurate the conjectures are about unmitigated damage.
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This idea can be stated more formally as follows. Let Pr(zt>0) be the probability that the
decision maker will choose to invest in mitigation at time t. By the assumption that
conjectures about unmitigated damage are unbiased estimates of the true unmitigated
damage, this likelihood can be expressed as the following function of mitigation’s true
effectiveness and the joint distribution of the errors ε and δ:
Pr( zt > 0) = Pr(d t < d t' )
= Pr[(d t* (1 − mI t ) + ε ) < (d t* + δ )]
= Pr[(ε − δ ) < mI t d t*

(1)

where mI t is the proportional level of protection actually possessed by the decision maker
and d t* is the true level of damage that would be observed given no mitigation. Because,
by definition, E(ε-δ)=0, expression (1) implies that the likelihood of investing will be
monotonically increasing in the product mI t d t* regardless of the assumptions one makes
about the distribution of errors; that is, on average a decision maker will be more likely to
(correctly) conclude their investments have paid off when size of the quake is large ( d t*
is large), they have invested substantially in mitigation ( I t is large) and these investments
are truly effective (m→1).
But note that under this process, the speed of learning may not be particularly fast
nor uniquely converge to the maximum (optimal) investment. One impedance will be the
variance in the joint distribution of errors; the greater the variance, the better the odds on
a given trial that the decision maker will mistakenly conclude that dt≥ d’t (mitigation is
ineffective) and hence reduce or discontinue her investments. In the extreme, as
Var(ε,δ)→∞ equilibrium investments will converge to 50%--that which would arise
under a random guessing policy. Likewise, it should be clear that decision makers could
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also never learn to stop investing in mitigation when it is, in fact, truly ineffective (m=0).
In that case investments would act as a random guessing policy, since on each trial the
decision maker would be just as likely to falsely conclude that mitigation was effective
when it was not (regardless of the amount that had been invested) as correctly conclude
that it was ineffective (i.e., in this case Pr(z>0)=Pr(ε-δ)>0=.5 for all It, dt*).
Can learning be improved by observing others?

An important limitation of the above analysis, however, is that it overlooks an
important feature of real-world mitigation decisions: the ability to observe and learn from
the behavior of others. The communal nature of mitigation decisions provides individuals
with two potential aids to learning:
1. The ability to observe and analyze instances of damage caused by hazards
among households that have made varying investment in mitigation; and
2. The ability to imitate the behavior of households who are believed to hold
superior experiential knowledge about hazards.
While it may indeed be the case that hazards are rarely directly experienced, one
could easily learn about the effectiveness of mitigation strategies by observing behavior
in other settings. But would individuals naturally undertake such inferential analyses?
Empirical evidence from related research in other task settings would not seem
encouraging in this regard. There is a large body of work showing that individuals often
see the negative experiences of others as holding limited relevance to their own personal
judgments about risk (Weinstein 1980; Weinstein and Klein 1996). Specifically,
judgments about personal risk have often been found to be marked by a social optimism
bias, that is, individuals tend to believe that their personal risk of succumbing to a
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probabilistic hazard (such as a disease) is less than that faced by others (Weinstein and
Klein 1996). Hence, for example, while witnessing a distant neighbor’s house collapse as
a result of an earthquake may well trigger the belief that the neighbor faces heightened
risk, it may do little to alter personal beliefs about the need for mitigation.
Even if homeowners did try to learn from the experiences of others, past work on
the quality of intuitive inference suggests that data which is inconsistent with prior beliefs
will be likely be either overlooked or ignored (see., e.g.., Klayman and Ha 1987). In
much the same way that a smoker might point to the example of a 100 year old man who
smokes a pack of cigarettes a day as proof that the hazards of smoking are overstated,
homeowners who believe that mitigation is not cost-effective might turn to unmitigated
homes that survive disasters as proof that there is no need for them to invest in protection.
In short, the fact that people can observe the experiences of others provides no assurance
that they will effectively learn from these data.
There is, of course, a far simpler way to learn from observation: simply mimic the
behavior of other homeowners who are believed to hold superior knowledge about
mitigation strategies (e.g., Coleman, Katz, and Menzel 1966). Indeed, as noted by a
number of authors (e.g., Edwards 1993; Kunreuther, 1978; Lindell and Perry 2000), most
individual decisions about investing in hazard mitigation tend to be made by observing
and following community norms rather than by making independent assessments of costs
and benefits. As noted by Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992), such a heuristic
approach could be rational if one believes that strategies that perform better are more
likely to be adopted than those that perform worse. In other words, following the herd
can be an effective—and highly efficient—strategy for making mitigation decisions.
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If, however, the initial set of decisions made in a community are themselves misguided,
norm-based processes might do more to reinforce and perpetuate suboptimal actions than
alleviate them. One of the greatest fears of emergency management officials is that
individuals refuse to evacuate after a disaster warning because they see none of their
neighbors are leaving their homes.
2. Empirical Analysis
Overview

Two experiments investigate the ability of individuals to learn optimal mitigation
strategies over time by their own experience and that of their neighbors. Participants face
the task of discovering the most cost-effective way of protecting their home against the
risk of earthquakes. Over time they have the ability to gain this knowledge both by
experimenting with mitigation investments and directly observing the resulting damage to
their homes from an earthquake as well as indirectly observing the investment decisions
and experiences of others living nearby. Earthquakes were chosen because the subjects
(graduate and undergraduate students at a Northeastern University) would have had
limited prior decision-making experience and we wished to insure that behavior reflected
knowledge gained in the course of the simulation rather than previously-formed beliefs.
The two experiments had somewhat different objectives. The first was designed
to provide an assessment of learning abilities in a controlled environment where
participants were free to make their own investment decisions over time, but where the
observed actions of others were generated by programmed agents. The second
experiment examined learning abilities in a much more realistic—but less controlled—
setting where participants made mitigation decisions in real community of acquaintances.
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Participants and Procedure

87 undergraduate and graduate students volunteered to participate in response to a
cash incentive. Experiments were run on a small-group basis in a behavioral research lab
with each participant seated in a partitioned cubicle, each equipped with a personal
computer. In return for participating in the experiment, all subjects received a $10 showup fee and were told that the participant who earned the highest score in the game
(defined below) would be given a $200 cash reward.
Participants were asked to imagine that they had just moved into a home in a
hypothetical country that was prone to periodic earthquakes, and would be living there
for 5 years. This home was valued at $40,000, and after the 5 years their performance in
the task would be defined by a “wealth score”, which was this initial house value
($40,000) minus the costs of repairs from experienced earthquakes and total investments
in mitigation. To simplify the task, participants faced no liquidity constraints and funds
not spent on mitigation or repair could not be externally invested. Participants thus could
continue to buy protection and make repairs even when their wealth score dropped below
zero, and there was no extraordinary penalty for negative scores. Finally, when an
earthquake arose participants were automatically charged for the cost to repair the home
to a like-new state, with the cost of the repair being the percentage of a home that had
been damaged (hence, if a participant’s home was 100% destroyed, they would be billed
$40,000).
Participants played eight independent replications of this five-year ownership
game. After each five-year cycle the financial slate would be wiped clean, and another 5-
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year cycle would begin. Each subject’s overall score in the simulation was their
cumulative net assets after the eight replications (40 total decision periods).
The central interface, reproduced in Figure 1, consisted of a map of the
hypothetical country that displayed the location of the participant’s residence as well as
that of other players, updated information about their current wealth, their total losses,
and their current level of mitigation. As play progressed in each period (or year), buttons
would appear on the interface enabling participants to navigate through four phase of
decision making:
1. Information search. By clicking on a button that said, “learn about
earthquakes and their dangers”, subjects were taken to a series of research
reports that provided detailed information about the frequency with which
they might expect to encounter earthquakes of varying severity, the damage
that a quake of a given magnitude could impose on an unmitigated home
conditional on its location and strength. At the start of the simulation all
subjects were required to certify that they had read these reports before they
were permitted to undertake mitigation decisions. The use of this information
was then discretionary.
2. Investments in mitigation. By clicking on a button that said, “Buy Protection”
subjects were taken to an “earthquake protection store” where they could buy
up to 100 “mitigation units” at a cost of $100 per unit. Investments in
mitigation were cumulative and non-revocable within any 5-year cycle. In
addition, by clicking a button that said, “See others’ protection” a map
displayed the most recent levels of mitigation undertaken by other players.
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3. Earthquake determination. After a person made decision whether or not to
gather information and/or buy mitigation, he or she clicked on a “ready”
button. They were then shown a series of six green or red buttons that
indicated whether or not other players had finished making their decisions
(Figure 4). When all buttons turned green subjects either viewed the message,
“no quake this year”, or, if there was a quake, its location and magnitude. A
quake was manifested on the screen by an animation that showed a set of
concentric circles emanating from its epicenter, as well as a text message
indicting its strength.
4. Damage resolution. If there was a quake, a button appeared on the screen
labeled “view damage reports”, which took participants to a new screen that
showed the level of damage experienced by each player’s home. On that
same screen players were also given the opportunity to view the levels of
protection undertaken by each player, so they could easily toggle between
information about levels of protection and levels of experienced damage.
If the participant’s home suffered damage from an earthquake, the dollar loss was
immediately deducted from his wealth total for that cycle of the simulation. In other
words, the participant was charged the cost of repairing the damage. The home was then
assumed to be rebuilt with the previously level of mitigation (if any) restored. Note that
if the total amount spent on repairs and mitigation exceeded the initial home value, the
the participant would have a negative wealth total for that particular cycle of the
simulation. There was no extraordinary penalty for having a negative wealth total (such
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as interest payments); it simply lowered the overall score a participant would realize over
all rounds of the simulation.
Simulation Parameters

The research reports provided to subjects at the start of the simulation informed
them that in any given year there was a 50% chance that an earthquake of some
magnitude would occur somewhere in the country, with its epicenter being randomly
determined. In addition, there were four possible levels of earthquake intensity ranging
from “minor” to “extreme”, with conditional probabilities of .5, .30, .20, and .10,
respectively conveyed by means of a histogram.
The percentage of a home i’s value that would be lost if the quake’s epicenter
was at location j occurred (Pij) was given by the formula Pij = e

−αd ij

SV (1 − I )(1 − m ) ,

where d ij was the Euclidean distance between the quake’s epicenter j and the home, S
was defined as the scalar measure of the quake’s strength, V was the value of the player’s
home, I was the percentage of possible mitigation units purchased by the player, m was a
continuous scalar parameter bounded by the range [0,1] that captured the marginal
effectiveness of improvements (unknown to subjects), and α was a scaling parameter.
Subjects were not given this formula, but were conveyed its meaning by being shown a
histogram that plotted the percentage of a home’s value that would be lost conditional on
its strength at two distances: one whether the home was at the quake epicenter and one
where it was at a maximum distance from the epicenter as shown on the map.
Subjects were told that there was considerable disagreement among mitigation
experts about whether investments were worthwhile, with half claiming that it was highly
effective and half claiming that it was ineffective. Subjects were told that the true value
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was something they would need to discover on their own by experience, and there was a
single “true” value of mitigation that applied to all residents in their community of
players. This true value of m was determined at the start of a given set of eight
replications, with mitigation being effective for half of all communities (the case where
m=.8) and mitigation being ineffective for the other half (the case where m=0). The
damage function was scaled such that subjects in the high-effectiveness conditions should
have invested the maximum in protection (100 units) while those in the low-effectiveness
condition should have invested zero.
The Social Feedback Manipulation. While participants were led to believe that

the simulations were networked, they, in fact, were playing independently, with the
information they received about the actions of other players being controlled by
programmed agents. To make this manipulation convincing participants waited varying
amounts of time for other “players” to finish making their decisions.
Waiting times were stochastic and a function of the time the participant took to
make his or her choice (those making the decision very quickly had to wait longer),
whether other players suffered damage in the last round (if there was no quake the
elapsed time was short), and the stage in the simulation (mean waiting times decreased as
the game progressed). In debriefings after the simulation none of the participants
indicated a belief that the decisions they saw being made by other players might have
been computer generated. One-third of the subjects were assigned to a “solo play” control
group, where no information was ever provided about the decisions being made by
others. The others were given feedback that reflected one of two programming rules:
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1. Mirrored play. Simulated players observed the investment decision made by
the participant in period i, and implemented the same decision with random
noise in period i+1.
2. Positive leaders1. Simulated players gradually invested higher amounts in
mitigation over the eight game replications regardless of its true effectiveness.
The updating rule was Iit=αDit-1+ε, where Dhit-1 was the damage recorded by
the simulated player if there was an earthquake in the previous period, and ε
was a uniform random error. The slope parameter α was chosen such that
mean investments by other players was 100 units (the maximum) by the
eighth round of the simulation.
Note that under the second process, simulated community decisions evolved
toward perfect optimality in cases where mitigation was effective but perfect
suboptimality when mitigation had no benefits.
Results

Overall learning efficiency. As noted above, in the simulation there were two
asymptotic mitigation optima that depended on the true effectiveness of mitigation;
subjects who discovered that mitigation was effective should have purchased 100 units of
mitigation, while those who discovered that it was ineffective should have purchased 0.
Of course, since effectiveness was uncertain ex-ante, realistically we might only hope to
see convergence to these optima over time, as subjects learn from the experience of their
own investments and those made by other (programmed) players. The analysis of simple
learning rules that we presented at the outset, however, suggests that this convergence
may be asymmetric: trial and error might properly lead subjects to invest more in learning
1

A “negative leader” condition was not run due to limitations in subject resources.
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when it is effective, but have more difficulty discouraging subjects from investing when
it is ineffective.
Figure 2 plots the average investment levels over time when mitigation was truly
effective (broken line) and truly ineffective (solid line). While the data reveal some initial
awareness of the true effectiveness of mitigation among participants—investments were
25% higher when mitigation was effective during the first two cycles of home ownership
compared to when it was ineffective. The data reveal that following these two cycles
there was no movement toward either of the normative equilibria (100%, 0%). Indeed, if
anything, the data show a tendency for the difference in mean mitigation between these
conditions to deteriorate over time with those who were learning that mitigation was
effective investing less.
To provide insights into the degree to which the mean investment levels plotted in
Figure 2 were driven by individual differences in decisions about whether mitigation was
worthwhile at all, in Figure 3 we plot the percentage of subjects who decided to purchase
any protection in the first year of homeownership (when investment had their greatest
value), and the mean protection conditional on purchase. The figure suggests that
subjects actually approached the simulation with rather optimistic priors about value of
investing in at least some mitigation; 94% purchased some mitigation when first given
the opportunity—
when they had the first ( mitigation had its greatest
To provide a more rigorous statistical analysis of investments over time we
modeled observed mitigation levels over time as a linear function of fourteen predictors:
1. True migration effectiveness
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2. Year of tenure in the home (1-5);
3. Game replication (or tenure cycle; 1-8);
4. Lagged level of mitigation;
5. Social feedback condition (2 contrasts: positive leaders v. solo play and
mimicked decisions v. solo play);
6. The interactions between true effectiveness and lagged protection level and
game replication
7. The interaction between social feedback condition and predictors 1, 2 and 3
The results of this analysis, reported in Table 1, lent statistical support to the qualitative
observation about learning offered above. The analysis supports a modest positive effect
of true effectiveness (t=3.176; p=.048), but no interaction between this effect and game
replicate—implying a a lack of convergence toward the optima with increased game
experience. On the other hand, the analysis suggests that subjects at least grasped the
normative idea that investments in mitigation were less worthwhile as the time horizon of
ownership decreased—as evidenced by a significant negative effect of year in the home
(t=-18.43, p<.0001).
Did having access to decisions made by others aid learning? The analysis suggests
that it did not. First, the data fail to support a significant “positive leader”-by-true
effectiveness interaction (p=.129), implying that observing other players increase their
investments over time did little to enhance (or deflate) learning of true effectiveness
compared with solo play. Second, while the analysis supports a significant interaction
between mirrored play and true effectiveness (p<.001), the coefficient of the interaction is
negative in sign—implying that as game experienced increased investments by subjects
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in the mirrored-play social condition displayed less discrimination between the two true
effectiveness conditions. In other words, in this case having access to social feedback
appeared to hurt learning rather than enhance it.
Process analyses: why didn’t participants learn? To provide deeper insights into
the processes that drove participants’ mitigation decisions in the task, Figure 3
superimposes plots of two features of participants’ mitigation decisions over time,
pooling over social feedback conditions: the relative frequency with which participants
purchased mitigation (of any quantity) in the first year of each 5-year cycle of ownership,
and the lagged effect of experienced earthquake damage on whether additional mitigation
was purchased in each subsequent year (p(buy|loss). The figure suggests that during the
first several cycles of home ownership investments evolved over time through the
following stylized anchor-and adjustment strategy:
Start each 5-year cycle of home ownership by purchasing a limited buffer stock of
mitigation. If earthquake losses are then experienced in that or subsequent
periods, react by buying additional units of protection as a decreasing function of
the time horizon of ownership remaining in that cycle.
To illustrate, in each of the first four games of the simulation (each with 5 years
of home ownership) 85% of participants purchased at least one unit of mitigation when
first given the opportunity, but the amount was limited (a mean of 34 units of a possible
100), and not significantly related to true effectiveness (33 when it was ineffective, 35
when it was effective; F(1,402)=.77; p=.38). As shown in Figure 3, after that initial
purchase, on average subsequent purchases were made in decreasing responsiveness to
experienced earthquake losses, which might be interpreted as a rational response to the
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decreasing time horizon of hazard. For example, in the first two games an average of
50% of participants bought more protection after experiencing a quake loss in the first
year of home ownership, but this decreased to an average of 13% when a quake loss was
experienced in the fourth year of any cycle (the last year there would have been an
opportunity to make a purchase).
After four such cycles of investment dynamics, participants then appeared to
settle into a more stable process characterized by a fixed initial investment that was less
likely to be revised given subsequent earthquake losses. Specifically, in the first four
games when quake damage was experienced in the first year of homeownership 39% of
the time, on average, this event was followed by a decision to purchase more protection.
In the last four games, however, earthquake damage in the first year was followed by a
decision to purchase more protection only 7% of the time (13% if the damage occurred in
the second year). As shown in Figure 3, this was not due to subjects buying more initially
and simply having less of an ability to buy later (the series of black dots in the figure).
Rather, the data are more consistent with subjects simply concluding that their initial
protection purchase was not one that they could particularly improve upon by buying
more after an earthquake—though some subjects (about 10%) were still trying to
adaptively learn in this manner until the very end of the task.
Friends and Neighbors effects. To further explore how decisions about mitigation
were affected by the ability to observe the decisions made by others, in Figures 4a-4c we
plot mean investment levels over time for each social feedback condition by true
mitigation effectiveness. The Figures provide two insights about how social feedback
affected decisions over time that clarify the statistical analyses previously reported in
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Table 1. First, it shows that the significant negative interaction between true
effectiveness and mirrored-play did not reflect globally diminishing learning abilities in
this one condition, but rather poor performance by participants in one intermediate phase
if the task: their sixth and seventh homes (trials 25-35). Hence, while having access to
this kind of feedback did not aid learning, it also did not appear to harm it.
The Figure also suggests that subjects who were placed in communities where
other decision makers gradually invested more in mitigation over time (reaching 100% by
the eighth home cycle), did imitate this behavior, but the effect was quite small, and not
conditioned by whether the high investments that other participants were making was
optimal or not. For example, in the eight game replicate—when participants would have
seen their peers investing 100% in mitigation—investment levels averaged of 52% in the
case where the 100% was optimal (compared to 42% and 45% for the solo and mirroredfeedback conditions, respectively), and 35% when it was suboptimal (compared to 32%
and 24% for the solo and mirrored-feedback conditions, respectively).
Why were participants not more influenced by peer actions? Insight into this is
provided in Figure 5, which plots the relative frequency with which participants looked at
the mitigation levels of other players when making their own investment decisions. The
figure provides a simple explanation: participants began the simulation actively looking
at mitigation of others (over the first 5 trials the mean percentage was 70%), but this
interest in the actions of others rapidly diminished, averaging 35% over the last three
cycles. Hence, subjects may have arrived at a strategy after the first 2-3 rounds of play
that they felt no need to change. Alternatively after first being curious about the actions
of others, they may have quickly concluded that the information was of little value in
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making their own decisions. The reality, of course, was far from that: by comparing
other players’ mitigation levels with their experienced damage in would have, in theory,
been possible for participants to quickly and conclusively discover whether mitigation
was effective or not.
Discussion

The failure of subjects to learn the optimal mitigation policies in the simulation is
at least somewhat surprising in light of the plethora of information subjects could have
used to more accurately guide their decisions. In particular, within each round of play
subjects had the opportunity to statistically infer the true effectiveness of mitigation by
studying not only their experiences but also those of others. Likewise, they were
provided with actuarial information about the levels of damage that they should have
observed given quakes of various magnitudes and distances, something that, in principle,
would have greatly aided assessments of effectiveness. Finally, most critically, they had
the opportunity to learn through several rounds of play. Yet, subjects persistently
underinvested in mitigation when it was optimal to heavily invest, and over-invested
when it was optimal not to invest.
What explains this apparent learning failure? The data suggest that the
inefficiencies accrued, at least in part, to a failure by subjects to attempt to learn during
the task. Specifically, they declined to make full use of the experiential information that
was available to them on each trial, and revealed a deteriorating interest in learning as the
task was replicated. As time progressed subjects made fewer attempts to look at how the
mitigation decisions of others was related to the damage they suffered after quakes, and
their own decisions about investing were decreasingly sensitive to experienced losses
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over time. Hence, long-term investment levels reflected what was learned early in the
task--a brief period where those in high-effectiveness conditions learned to invest more
than those in low-effectiveness conditions, but far short of the level that would be
optimal.
This finding, however, comes with the caveat that the failure of subjects to utilize
social feedback to aid learning might have accrued to way community interaction was
simulated in the task. The social setting subjects faced was a highly stylized one in
which the decisions they viewed were simulated rather than real, and decisions were
made in a lock-step fashion where the actions taken by others were observable only after
all decisions had been made in a given round and submitted for play.
Subjects who sensed this fact (even if they did not articulate it) would naturally
have been skeptical about its value. Hence, if a subject was unsure whether to purchase
mitigation in a given round, he or she could only see what other players had done in the
previous round—when the circumstances may well have been quite different (e.g., there
would have been a longer time horizon, and there may or may not have been an
earthquake). Either one of these factors could have caused subjects to see the social
feedback as being much less useful for learning than would be the case in a more natural
setting,
To address this concern, we designed a second experiment that allowed us to
examine whether the findings of the first study generalize to a more realistic simulation
where decisions were made by a real networked community of players, and where players
could simultaneously observe and react to the decisions made by others.
Experiment 2
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Participant and Procedure

The subjects were 109 undergraduate and graduate students who volunteered to
participate in a simulation exercise similar to Experiment 1, but with two major
differences:
1. The simulation was programmed in real time allowing subjects to
continuously observe and respond to the changes in the investment decisions
being made by other players;
2. The observed decisions were actually those of other players rather than
programmed agents.
Several other enhancements were designed to increase both the likelihood that
subjects would attend to the decisions being made by other players as well as enhance the
task’s overall realism. At the start of the simulation all house icons took the form of
uncolored outlines of houses. Home-protection decisions now took the form of discrete
construction improvements that had a cumulative maximum investment score of 100.
These included structurally sounder chimneys, foundations, roof, walls, and/or windows
and changed the color of this part of the house to orange. The current level of mitigation
held by each player was displayed on the map screen both numerically and graphically in
the form of a house icon where the color of different components reflected the level of
mitigation. The mitigation levels of all players were in constant view throughout the
simulation, and new purchases of mitigation and earthquake damages were instantly
updated on the map screen.
Because the simulation was run in real time, subjects could make purchases of
protection at anytime they wished during the simulation without having to wait for other

26

players. Participants were told that each had a starting wealth of $50,000, of $40,000
reflected in the value of the home and $10,000 cash that could either be invested at a 10%
rate of return (compounded and paid a fixed number of times during the course of the
simulation) or used to purchase protective improvements.
Earthquakes could occur at any moment. As in the first experiment, when an
earthquake occurred it was showed in an animated fashion by a set of concentric circles
emanating from its epicenter. If a home was damaged by the quake, the house icon for
that player momentarily changed to that of a half-collapsed house, with the percentage of
damage being displayed numerically. To simulate the need to rebuild, the icon then
changed to a house under construction with the word “repairing” flashing next to it. The
repair period lasted between five to ten seconds depending on the amount of damage,
during which time no additional protection improvements could be purchased.
The simulation was administered by having all groups play one 5-minute warmup round followed by three 10-minute full-length rounds of the simulation. All 10minute games utilized the same parameters, and involved an average of 4 earthquakes per
game. To encourage attention to the decisions being made by others, the homeowners in
each simulated community were introduced to each other prior to the start of the
simulation, and their names were depicted next to each respective house icon on the game
map. While verbal communication among the players was not permitted during the
simulation, it was allowed in the intervals between each 10 minute simulation.
All other design aspects of the simulation were the same as in the first
experiment. Subjects could learn about earthquake probabilities and consequences by
clicking on a “research” button, and each group of subjects were randomly assigned to
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one of two mitigation-effectiveness conditions: one where mitigation was marginally
effective (yielding an optimum of complete mitigation) and one where it was marginally
ineffective (yielding an optimum of zero mitigation).

Results

Did playing the simulation within a more realistic social community aid learning?
The answer was a strong “no”. In fact, the above changes degrade rather than enhance the
degree to which subjects were able to discover the mitigation optima. Across the three 10
minute simulations, subjects who were placed in high-effectiveness mitigation
environments ended each game with a mean protection level of 34 (median 26) units even
though the optimum was 100. Those in low-effectiveness mitigation environments ended
each game with a mean protection level of 35 units (median 24) instead of the optimum
of 0. Note that these mean investment levels are lower than those observed in the first
experiment, and are here not even directly consistent with the optimal levels of
investment
To provide a more rigorous analysis of the factors that drove investment
decisions, we regressed each player’s mean ending protection level against six predictors:
the mean level of protection purchased by others in the player’s community, the number
of players in the community, the true effectiveness of mitigation (a 0-1 indicator), game
replicate, the amount of time a subjects spent reading research reports, and the interaction
between true effectiveness and experience with the game.
The results of this analysis, reported in Table 2, provide a straightforward
explanation for the lack of learning that was observed in the task: investment decisions
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were almost exclusively driven by a single predictor: the level of investment observed
being made by others in the community (b=.5159; t=7.19; p<.001). In words, for each
unit mean unit of increased or decreased investment observed among other players,
subjects adjusted their own investments in the same direction by roughly 50%. In
contrast, we see no main effect of true effectiveness (and the coefficient is nominally
negative), and no interaction between effectiveness with game experience, implying no
evidence of learning. The only other predictor that approached significance was that of
the time spent reading research reports; those who read more—perhaps reflecting a
greater concern about avoiding damage invested more, regardless of whether mitigation
was effective or not.
General Discussion

Much of what is known about how to protect against natural hazards has been
acquired through a costly process of trial and error. The 2004 Asian tsunami tragedy
provides a compelling case in point; as tragic as the loss of life was, it prompted
governments around the Indian Ocean to see the value in establishing a regional tsunami
warning system, a preventive measure long in place around the Pacific Rim to the east.
On the other hand, the fact that such a system was not in place in 2004 underscores how
ineffective learning can sometimes be. Although scientists had been making repeated
calls for tsunami warning systems to be established outside the Pacific in the years
preceding 2004, such calls had gone unheeded, presumably due to a lack of recent direct
experience with such events (http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2004/s2358.htm).
Are there inherent limits to our ability to learn about the effectiveness of
mitigation measures from past experience? This research examined this question by
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reporting how samples of experimental subjects made repeated decisions about whether
to invest in mitigation in two dynamic earthquake simulations. In the simulations there
was an optimal policy for mitigation that was unknown at the start but that could be
partially discovered over time either by direct experience or by observing the experiences
of other players.
On average participants grossly underinvested in mitigation when it was truly
effective and over invested when it was ineffective. There was little evidence of
investments converging toward optimal levels over time whether or not one was able to
observe, or were aided by being able to see the consequences of mitigation decisions
being made by others. The failure to converge to optima is consistent with previous
research showing that human decision makers are poor at learning from feedback in
complex noisy systems (e.g., Sterman 1989). Although the mechanism that drove
damage from earthquakes was deterministic, the complexity of the function would have
made it difficult for participants to discern the extent to discern causality from a given
damage episode (e.g., whether damage was low because mitigation was effective or the
quake was ineffective.
A participant who is thinking long-term should be willing to actively experiment
with mitigation investment level so that they can learn that one still incurs significant
damage given a maximum investment in mitigation Consistent with prior work (e.g.,
Meyer and Shi 1995), this is insight seems to elude participants. There were no cases in
either study of subjects purchasing 100% of available protection at the start of the task to
test a hypothesis about effectiveness. Rather, the modal strategy was to purchase a
limited amout (e.g., 25-30%)—a quantity that would be insufficient to provide significant
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protection if mitigation was effective, or, in turn, be informative as to whether it is
effective or not.
Participants also made limited use of the most readily-accessible source of
information about effectiveness at their disposal, the experiences of other decision
makers. In Experiment 2, where the decisions they were observing were those of other
real decision makers, investment decisions appeared herd-like, with the single greatest
driver of investment decisions being the modal investment being made by others. Suboptimality thus ended up being self-reinforcing. As more participants imitate the behavior
of others, there is less opportunity for them to learn. The evidence from Experiment 1,
however, suggests that herd instincts have their When individuals saw controlled
feedback that revealed to them that others were following suboptimal policies such as
investing in mitigation when they shouldn’t, the tendency to make decisions by imitation
vanished. Even in this case individuals were did not discover the optimal mitigation
strategy.
The data also suggest that subjects focus on what they discovered about
mitigation in the early rounds and simply tired of the task of learning. The first
experiment provided the clearest view of this effect. Decisions appeared to be
characterized by a simple anchor-and adjustment policy: participants started each round
of decisions by investing in a moderate amount of mitigation, then bought more if they
experienced a loss. After 2-3 cycles of applying this policy, participants seemed to
abandon further attempts to update this strategy. Reactions to experienced losses
diminished, as did their interest in viewing the mitigation decisions made by other
players.

31

Limitations and Future work

Whether the results reported here serve as a good model of limits to learning that
that might arise in real settings is unclear. On the one hand, circumstances of learning in
the experiments were far more favorable than they would be in a real-world setting.
Subjects had an explicit scoring rule tied to a monetary incentive, and they had access to
far greater amounts of both direct and indirect experiential information that would arise
in the real-world. On the other hand, subjects lacked many of the aids to decision making
that often arise in practice, such as the ability to talk to true experts. And perhaps most
important they faced only hypothetical losses.
Several of the biases observed in the simulation experiments appear consistent
with errors in mitigation decisions that have been noted in real-world settings. For
example, there is considerable empirical evidence of herd behavior in decisions about
whether to take preparedness actions in the face of hazards (e.g., Baker 1991; Edwards
1993), and the overriding importance of direct encounters with hazards as a basis for
perceptions of risk (e.g.,, Lindell and Perry 2000) and undertaking mitigation measures.
(Kunreuther 1978) . What is perhaps most surprising about the findings reported here is
that replication will not cure these biases nor that can they be reduced simply by putting
more information at the hands of decision makers.
Finally, we see this work as also highlighting the potential value of dynamic
laboratory simulations as a tool for gaining a better understanding of human response to
natural hazards. To date our knowledge of how individuals and households learn to adapt
to hazards has been limited simply because nature offers us few data points, and almost
never a natural experiment. While laboratory experiments will never emerge as a
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replacement for field studies, they may serve as a useful compliment by providing a
means for testing hypotheses about hazard response that may emerge from field work as
well as providing pointers for what to look for in future empirical studies. The research
reported here offers a simple illustration of this potential, and we hope it will foster
additional applications in the future.
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Table 1: OLS Regression of mitigation levels over time, Experiment 1

Parameter
Intercept
True Effectiveness
(TE)
Replicate
Year in Home
Lag Protection
Positive Leaders
(PL)
Mirrors Player
(MP)
TE*Replicate
TE*Lag Protection
PL*TE
PL*Replicate
PL*Year
MP*TE
MP*Replicate
MP*Year

Std
Estimate Error
T
p(T)
25.33581 2.854601
8.88 <.0001

3.176299 1.60772
-0.0201 0.463314
-5.80111 0.314845
0.896883 0.034832
1.222339 3.716493
7.037851
0.01902
-0.027
2.574409
-0.41285
-0.46462
-5.44446
-0.5511
0.817815

2.963405
0.267601
0.020446
1.69781
0.32422
0.520328
1.392549
0.30193
0.487448

1.98
-0.04
-18.43
25.75

0.0483
0.9654
<.0001
<.0001

0.33 0.7423
2.37 0.0176
0.07 0.9433
-1.32 0.1867
1.52 0.1295
-1.27 0.203
-0.89
0.372
-3.91 <.0001
-1.83 0.0681
1.68 0.0935

Overall model: F(14,3187)=485.1, p<.001; R2=.68
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Table 2: OLS Regression of ending mitigation levels, Experiment 2

Std
Parameter
Estimate Error
Intercept
.1832
.0620
True Effectiveness
-.0239
.0449
Replicate
-.0064
.0173
Group Size
-.0039
.0117
Time spent on Research
.0004
.0028
Mean investment by
other players
.5159
.0718
Effectiveness*Replicate
.0435
.0617

T

2.96
-.53
-.37
-.33
1.31

p(T)
.0034
.5963
.7106
.7424
.1910

7.19
.71

<.0001
.4812

Overall model: F(6,257)=9.853, p<.001; R2=.187
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Figure 1: Main simulation interface used in Experiment.
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Optimal v. Actual Protection Levels over time
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Figure 2: Average observed investment levels over time by true mitigation effectiveness.
Oscillations accrue to increasing investments over 8 five-year ownership blocks,
Experiment 1.
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Starting Mitigation Purchases and Subsequent Purchase Likelihoods Conditoned by Losses
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Figure 3: Changes in purchased mitigation at the start of each 5-year tenure (solid dots),
and the probability that an additional purchase was made in each subsequent period
conditional on a lagged experienced loss (lines) , Experiment 1.
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4a: Solo Play
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4b: Other Players Mimic Participant
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Figure 4 Average observed investment levels by social-feedback condition and true
mitigation effectiveness over trials, Experiment 1.
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4c: Other Players Increase Mitiagtion over Time
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Figure 4 (continued): Average observed investment levels by social-feedback condition
and true mitigation effectiveness over trials, Experiment 1.
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Mean Frequency of Looking at Peer Mitigation by Social Feedback Condition
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Figure 5. Mean relative frequency with which participants looked at the mitigation levels
of other players by social feedback condition and trail block, Experiment 1
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